May 29 - Testimony of Dr. George D. Mudd about Dr. Samuel Mudd
GEORGE D. MUDD, a witness called for the accused, Samuel A. Mudd, being duly sworn, testified as follows:
Q. What relation are you to him, if any?
A. His father and my father were first cousins: perhaps there was a little stronger relationship than that. He was a student under me many years ago. I was his preceptor in the study of medicine.
Q. State to the Court whether you know his reputation in the neighborhood in which he lives for peace, order, and good citizenship.
A. I know of no one whose reputation is better in that regard. Very good.
Q. State what his reputation is, if you know it, as a master.
A. I have always considered him a humane man to his fellow-men, whether they be his servants or otherwise. He always fed and clothed his servants well, to my knowledge, and treated them kindly, as far as I know.
Q. Will you state whether or not you saw Dr. Mudd on the Sunday after the assassination of the President?
A. Yes, sir: I saw him at church. He overtook me after that on my way to Bryantown, and I rode with him as far as the house.
Q. State whether he said any thing to you about any persons having been at the house.
The JUDGE ADVOCATE.
You need not answer that question. I do not think we introduced the declarations of Dr. Mudd at that time. It is very clear the Government has not offered the declarations of the prisoner at that time.
I propose to offer that statement for the purpose of showing that Dr. George Mudd, who states that he is a resident of Bryantown, and who, I will prove, is a man of well-known, unquestionable, and active loyalty, that the prisoner at the bar informed him that there were two suspicious persons at his house on Saturday morning; told him of the circumstances of their coming there; expressed to him a desire that he should inform the military authorities, if he thought it advisable, of the fact of their having been there; stated to him that he wished him to take it direct to the military authorities, and not tell it at large about the streets, but the parties or their friends might assassinate him [the prisoner] for the disclosure. I can imagine no declaration of a prisoner more clearly admissible than this. It accompanies, or is connected with, acts which they have shown of the preceding day, and of subsequent days; it is a part of the very gist of the acts and omissions by which he is sought to be implicated here; and to refuse to allow him to show that he informed the Government, through one of its most loyal friends, of the presence of these men in his house, and his suspicions in regard to them, would be to strip him of a complete and admissible defence. On the subject of such actions—for this statement was an act—I read an authority from “Russell on Crimes,” vol. ii, p. 150:— “When hearsay is introduced, not as a medium of proof in order to establish a distinct fact, but as being in itself a part of the transaction in question, it is then admissible; for to exclude it might be to exclude the only evidence of which the nature of the case is capable. Thus in Lord George Gordon’s case, on a prosecution for high treason, it was held that the cry of the mob might be received in evidence as part of the transaction (21 Ho, St. Tr. 535). And, generally speaking, declarations accompanying acts are admissible in evidence as showing the nature, character, and objects of such acts. Thus when a person enters into land in order to take advantage of a forfeiture, to foreclose a mortgage, to defeat a disseizin, or the like, or changes his actual residence, or is upon a journey, or leaves home, or returns thither, or remains abroad, or secretes himself, or in fine, does any other act material to be understood, his declarations, made at the time of the transaction, and expressive of its character, motive, or object, are regarded as verbal acts indicating a present purpose and intention, and are therefore admitted in proof like any other material facts. They are part of the res gestæ.” In a note to this section, the learned American editor of the work, Judge Sharswood, gives the following among other decisions in this country:— “Thus the declarations of the prisoner may be admitted to account for his silence when that silence would operate against him.”—The U. States v. Craig, 4 Wash. C. C. Rep. 729. That is just the case here. “Whenever the conduct of a person at a given time becomes the subject of inquiry, his expressions, as constituting a part of his conduct and indicating his intention, cannot be rejected as irrelevant, but are admissible as part of the res gestæ.”—Tenney v. Evans, 14 New Hamp. 353. It is to explain his silence up to the time of making the communication to Dr. George Mudd, and to rebut the evidence of Detective Lloyd as to his concealment, on the Tuesday following, of the fact that these two men had ever been at his house, that I propose to introduce that statement in evidence. This statement was made before he could have known that any suspicions were directed against him. It was an act done during the time of that silence and alleged concealment, by reasons of which they seek to implicate him as an accessory before and after the fact in the assassination. That conversation with Dr. George Mudd accounts for the silence: that conversation broke the silence. If the fact of his having been silent is to be urged against him, may not the fact that he broke the silence, and communicated all the facts to the military authorities, be introduced in his behalf? I hope the Judge Advocate and the Court will mark the act, that we do not introduce this for the purpose of showing that what Dr. Mudd then said was true. We do not introduce it for the purpose of explaining any thing as to the presence of these men in the house, or the acts they did there: we introduce it simply to show that he communicated as well as he could to the military authorities the fact of their presence, and, at the same time, gave the explanation of his caution then and his silence before. No authority could be more direct upon this point than the authority in United States v. Craig (4 Washington Circuit Court Reports), which is briefly stated in the note to Russell, which I before read: “Thus the declarations of a prisoner may be admitted to account for his silence when that silence would operate against him.”
The JUDGE ADVOCATE.
If the Court please, the principle here is almost too well settled to be the subject of discussion. While it is competent for the Government to give in evidence declarations of a prisoner on trial, his confessions, it is not competent for him to do so. That is perfectly clear; but, when these confessions are introduced, he has a right to insist that the whole of them shall be given. That is the principle. Now, we have offered no declarations in evidence which were made by the prisoner at the bar on Sunday, the day spoken of by the witness. The ground, then, on which it is sought to introduce them, is that they are part of the res gestæ. The res gestæ at that moment had been completed. The res gestæ in which he was involved, and which is the subject of arraignment on the part of the Government, had closed the day before. That consisted in his having received and entertained these men, and sent them on their way rejoicing; having fed them; having set the leg of the one whose leg was broken; having comforted and strengthened and encouraged them, as far as his hospitality and professional skill could do so, to proceed in their journey. That is the res gestæ, the transaction on which the Government arraigns him; and that was complete at four o’clock on Saturday evening. Now, on a subsequent day, on Sunday, after carefully reviewing his own conduct, he proposes to introduce a line of declaration on his part, nearly twenty-four hours afterwards, by which he seeks to relieve himself of the imputation which the law attaches to his previous conduct, which has been the subject of the testimony before this Court. I say it is not competent for him to do so, it is not competent for him to declare the motives by which his previous action was governed, because we have no means of reaching those motives; we have no means of introducing testimony in regard to them; we have introduced no testimony in regard to them. And the great principle which says that a criminal shall not manufacture testimony for his own exculpation intervenes, and forbids that this Court shall hear that testimony. Any act of the prisoner he may introduce, because in regard to that we ourselves can introduce testimony; but declarations which may have been framed upon careful review of his own conduct, solely for the purpose of his vindication against the accusation which he must have seen would arise from that conduct, cannot be heard upon any principle of testimony whatever.
I have one further remark to make to the Court. The Judge Advocate says that the transaction was wholly closed. Not so. The charge here is a charge of concealment among others; and the concealment, as they have sought to prove it, was a concealment not only of their presence while they were in the house, but a concealment, extending until Tuesday or Friday, of the fact of their having been there. Two of the witnesses for the prosecution who went there on Tuesday—two out of the four—said, upon their examination in chief, that Dr. Mudd denied that two men had been at his house. That was part of the testimony for the prosecution. It was not irrelevant testimony: it was legitimately applicable to this charge of concealment, which is made in broad and general terms, and which applies as well to his concealing them while they were there as to his concealing their course after they left, and the fact that they had been there. In support of that charge of concealment, as I said before, they have introduced testimony that he denied on Tuesday that they had been there; and now they propose to exclude us from proving that he informed the Government on Sunday that they had been there. It would be most unjust to exclude it, and contrary to the authorities which I have cited, one of which is explicitly and clearly in point.
The JUDGE ADVOCATE.
If the gentleman will frame his question so as to bring out simply the conduct of the party in the act he did, I shall not object; but I must object to his declarations.
The question has been asked. I cannot prove how he informed the government, without proving the words he used. If the witness were the Judge Advocate General, I could not prove that Dr. Mudd had informed him of their presence there, without proving what he said to him.
ASSISTANT JUDGE ADVOCATE BURNETT.
The abstract question could certainly be asked, “Did Dr. Samuel A. Mudd direct you to go to the authorities, and inform them that these parties had been there?
I claim more than that: I claim the whole statement.
The COMMISSION sustained the objection of the Judge Advocate.
By MR. EWING:
Q. State whether you communicated to the military authorities in Bryantown the fact of any suspicious persons having been at the house of Dr. Samuel A. Mudd on Saturday.
A. I did.
Q. State to whom you communicated it.
A. I communicated it to Lieutenant Dana, who was the principal in command of the military there at that time.
Q. When did you communicate it to him?
A. I think it was on Monday morning.
Q. What statement did you make to him?
A. I stated to him that Dr. Samuel Mudd had informed me that two suspicious parties were at his house,—came there a little before daybreak on Saturday morning; and that one of them had, as he said, a broken leg, which he bandaged; that they were laboring under some degree of excitement,—more so, he thought, than should arise from a broken leg; that these parties stated that they came from Bryantown, and were inquiring the way to the Rev. Dr. Wilmer’s; that whilst there one of them called for a razor, and shaved himself, thereby altering his appearance; that he improvised a crutch, or some crutches, for the broken-legged man, and that they went in the direction of Parson Wilmer’s. I think that is about the whole of what I told the lieutenant.
Q. From whom did you get your information?
A. From Dr. Mudd, the prisoner.
Q. What time on Monday did you make the communication?
A. I think, Monday morning.
Q. By whose authority did you make the communication to him?
A. The mentioning of that matter to me, or any other matter bearing on an assassination, particularly such an assassination as the country and world now mourn, was my warrant and authority from him or anybody else who knew me.
Q. At the time he communicated it to you, was any thing said about communicating it to the military authorities?
A. When I left him, and was starting from him, I told him I would mention the matter to the authorities to see what could be made of it. He told me he would be glad if I would; but that, if I could make the arrangement, he would much prefer than he be sent for, and that he would give every information in his power relative to it; that, if it became a matter of publicity, he feared for his life on account of guerillas that might be infesting the neighborhood.
Q. Did you say to what authorities you would mention it?
A. To the authorities in Bryantown.
Q. Military or civil?
A. The military authorities already there.
Q. Did you make any other communication to any other military authorities of the facts stated to you by Dr. Samuel A. Mudd?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. To whom?
A. After that, I was sent for to my house, I think, on Tuesday afternoon. There were four detectives who asked me to go up in a room with them. They there questioned me very particularly relative to this affair. I stated to them what I have already stated here; and, upon my inability to answer such questions as they propounded, they immediately ordered their carriage, and asked me to direct them the way to Dr. Sam. Mudd’s house. I told them that I would do it, or that I would go with them. They seemed to prefer that; and I did go with them.
Q. State what happened when you went there.
A. These detectives went in: I was outside of the door. Dr. Sam. Mudd was not in the house. I was outside of the door, and saw him coming, and told him, as he entered the house, that the detectives had come there for the purpose of ascertaining the particulars relative to that matter which he had spoken to me about.
Q. You told him that?
A. Yes, sir; and that I made the statement to the military authorities which he had made to me on Sunday, and that they were up there for the purpose of making special inquiry in reference to it. I had already stated to the detectives that I felt confident the doctor would state the matter just as I had stated it to them, and would not and did not stay in there during their examination.
Q. Can you name the officers that went with you?
A. One was named Lloyd; another was named Gavacan, I think,—an Irishman. I would know the names of the others if they were mentioned, I think; but I do not now recollect them.
Q. Was Lieutenant Lovett one of the party?
A. He was one.
Q. Was Williams one of them?
A. Yes: Williams was the fourth.
Q. State whether any inquiry was made by any of them, after the conversation with Dr. Samuel Mudd, as to the route.
A. When we got in the wagon,—or, I think, just before getting in,—they asked me if I would direct them the way to Parson Wilmer’s. It was then nearly night. I told them I certainly would do so if necessary. I then turned, and asked Dr. Samuel Mudd, who was standing outside of the door, what was the best route to take to Parson Wilmer’s; which he gave me, and stated that there was a bad bridge around the way he directed us, which I remembered very well. Before we got to the main road leading to Bryantown, these gentlemen concluded—in consequence, it seems, of my stating to them that it was very little out of the way to go back by Bryantown to Parson Wilmer’s—to go that way; being a much better road, as I thought.
Q. State whether or not any thing was said by either of those gentlemen about Dr. Mudd’s having denied that the two men had been at his house.
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Will you state whether you were in Bryantown on Saturday at the time of and after the news of the assassination of President Lincoln reached there?
A. I was there when the news came, and remained there all evening; did not leave the village.
Q. What did you hear as to the person or persons implicated in the assassination?
A. Lieutenant Dana, on whom I called for information, told me that the party who had attempted the assassination of Secretary Seward was named Boyle, and claimed him to be the same party who assassinated Captain Watkins, of Anne Arundel County; and that the party who assassinated the President was supposed to be man by the name of Booth, but that he thought he had not yet gotten out of Washington.
Q. Was Boyle known in that region of country?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Had he been about there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was he supposed to be about there then?
A. No, sir: I think he had not been about there for three or four weeks, or later than two or three days after the assassination of Captain Watkins.
Q. What was his character as known there?
A. I think his character was very bad.
Q. Was he known as a desperado and guerilla?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. State whether you were at church on Sunday, and what was known there about the assassination of the President.
A. I was at church on Sunday. It was believed, and I may say known, then, that the President of the United States had been assassinated. It was talked about.
Q. Was it, or was it not, understood that Booth had not crossed the river?
A. No one, to my knowledge, supposed that he had crossed the river at that time. That was my impression: I did not make much inquiry relative to it.
Q. Did you have any conversation with Dr. Samuel Mudd at the church, or hear his conversation, as to what he knew of the assassination?
A. No, sir: I heard—
ASSISTANT JUDGE ADVOCATE BINGHAM.
You need not state anything you heard him say there.
I think it admissible, as explanatory of the conduct of the accused during the very time of the occurrence of the offences charged,—because, as I said before, one of the offences charged is concealment, which relates beyond that Sunday,—as showing his frame of mind, his information, his conduct.
ASSISTANT JUDGE ADVOCATE BINGHAM.
If your honors please, that is not the point here. Supposing the declaration to be that he did not know any thing about them, the gentleman claims here to prove, on his own motion, the declarations of Dr. Mudd on Sunday at church. If we had introduced any declarations of Dr. Mudd at that time and place, I admit the well-known rule of law is, that whatever he said, and all that he said, at that time, is admissible on his motion; what we did not give he would have a right to give: but I deny that there is any authority for introducing testimony of this sort as to his declarations at that time about this transaction. That is the question now. The gentleman read a while ago from a text that everybody is familiar with, which has relation to the declarations of third persons not parties to the record. There is not one single line in that text which he read which sustains any position he assumes here in regard to this matter. I desire to read the rule that does apply in regard to the prisoner on trial and his declarations,—Wharton’s “American Criminal Law,” vol. I, p. 358, § 699: “Declarations made by a prisoner in his own favor, unless part of the res gestæ, are not admissible for the defence. Thus, on an indictment for larceny, the defendant cannot give in evidence his declarations, at the time of the arrest, of his claims of ownership in the property taken; and, on an indictment against a prisoner for having in his possession coining-tools with intent to use them, he cannot give in evidence his declaration to an artificer, at the time he employed him to make such instruments, as to the purpose for which he wished them made. One indicted for murder cannot give in evidence his own conversations had after going a mile from the place of murder. And so, too, when a prisoner, in conversation with a witness, admitted the existence of a particular fact which tended strongly to establish his guilt, but coupled it with an explanation, which, if true, would exculpate him, it was held that the accused could not show that he had made the statement and explanation to others.” So it goes on all the way through. There is the law in regard to this matter. The man’s declarations at the time he committed that murder, being a part of the transaction, were admissible; but, after he had gone half a mile, they were inadmissible. Here is a party charged with harboring, concealing, and comforting a man, knowing him to be the murderer of the President of the United States. What he said in connection with the fact of harboring and concealing him, at the time, to these parties, he has a right to prove, because we have brought out that evidence ourselves. If he said anything in addition to what we have proved, he has a right to bring it out. Everybody knows that. But we have introduced no evidence whatever of what he said on Sunday at church. If we had introduced any evidence of that sort, I admit that, on the principles I have before stated, the accused would have a right to give in evidence all that he said at that time and place; but we have not offered any such evidence. If he is allowed to introduce his declarations on Sunday in regard to that transaction, and all that he said then,—because the question implies that the witness is to tell all he did say,—then he is to be allowed to introduce every declaration he may have made from that Sunday to this day, to everybody, and at every place; and, as I have before stated to the Court on that subject, the law has hedged itself about so that criminals shall not make evidence at their pleasure in that way on their own behalf, and adduce it in court to exculpate themselves from crime. If there were such a rule as that, it would be an end of the administration of justice, provided the courts should give credence to such testimony.
I wish to call the attention of the Court specially to the fact that the declaration as to which I am now inquiring was made during the time of the alleged commission of the offence of concealment. The offence of concealment, as charged and as attempted to be sustained by the proof on the part of the Government, was a concealment after the fact of the persons having been there, and of the route which they took; in other words, a concealment after their departure, as well as during their stay. According to the theory of the prosecution, he was committing that offence during all that time, from Saturday till the following Tuesday; and I say his declarations at the time of the alleged commission of the offence are admissible. The declaration now inquired about was on Saturday, showing his knowledge and frame of mind with refer-ence to the assassination; and therefore I think it admissible. I as-sure the Court that I do not wish to take up its time by pressing upon it irrelevant or inadmissible testimony; and, if I seem pertinacious, it is only because I think we have a right to show what is here offered. I ask the decision of the Court on the objection.
The COMMISSION sustained the objection of the Judge Advocate.
Q. [By MR. EWING.] At the time you speak of having made the communication to the officers, was any thing said to them by you about Dr. Samuel Mudd’s having gone with one of the parties for a carriage? and if so, what?
A. I told them so; and that was a part that I forgot to mention before. I told them that Dr. Sam. Mudd went from his house with the younger of the two men to try and procure a carriage to take them away from his house; that he went down the road towards Bryantown, and failed to get one; and they left his house on horseback.
Q. Did you tell them any thing as to how the man’s leg was broken?
A. Yes, sir: I think I told them that one bone of the leg was broken.
Q. Did you tell them any thing as to how it was said to have occurred?
A. From the fall of a horse.
Q. Will you state the distance of the church, at which you said you met Dr. Samuel Mudd on the Sunday after the assassination, from Bryantown?
A. I should suppose it to be about six miles and a half.
Q. And how far from Dr. Samuel Mudd’s house?
A. Two miles, or two and a half.
Q. Did you give them any description of the persons of these two men? If so, what description?
A. I do not think I gave them any.
Q. Will you state whether you are acquainted with Daniel J. Thomas, one of the witnesses for the prosecution?
A. I know him.
Q. Are you acquainted with the reputation in which he is held where he is known for veracity?
A. His reputation for veracity has always been very bad, I think, since ever I have known him.
Q. How long has that been?
A. I have known him since a boy.
Q. Could you state what his reputation for veracity was before the war?
A. I do not think any better than since the war.
Q. From your knowledge of his character for veracity, would you believe him under oath?
A. If there were a motive to misstate facts, I would not.
Q. Do you know any thing professionally of his mental condition?
A. I have considered him an insane man.
Q. State to to the Court how he is affected, and from what cause.
A. I have seen him manifest a sufficiently abnormal condition of mind as to confer in the courts irresponsibility for a criminal act. He is not always so insane as this, however. There seem to have been exacerbations and remissions in his manifestations of insanity. Sometimes I have met him when he was not in a more disordered condition of mind that eccentricity would imply, or rather not much more than an eccentricity the matter with him. I would state, that, in approaching a question of insanity, I feel great diffidence and distrust. Though it belongs to no profession more than to mine, I feel as if I shall be perplexed when the great master-minds of the country who have studied and understand thoroughly all the forms of medical legal jurisprudence, as I apprehend gentlemen of the Court to do, particularly the Judges Advocate, come to be my interrogators on the subject of insanity.
Q. Does his reputation for veracity, do you think, arise from his insanity alone?
A. I cannot distinctly say. I think it probable that his veracity is worse when the insane manifestations are stronger.
Q. Is his reputation for veracity good during the times his mental condition appears to be best?
A. I have never heard it so estimated, and I have never so estimated it.
Cross-examined by ASSISTANT JUDGE ADVOCATE BINGHAM:
Q. Be good enough to tell the Court what works you have read on insanity?
A. I have not read many works specially on insanity, except as I find medical jurisprudence.
Q. What work on medical jurisprudence have you read?
A. Taylor’s and others; and I have read a good deal on the matter of insanity in Dunglison’s works, and other works on physiology.
Q. Do any of them indicate how crazy a man has to be before he can be understood to be able to tell the truth?
A. I do not know that they do specially.
Q. Do you wish to be understood as giving it as your opinion, today, that Dan. Thomas is so crazy that he does not know how to tell the truth?
A. No, sir: I mean to say that there seems to be a mental and moral insanity, I think.
Q. You say that at times he is more insane, mentally and morally, that he is at other times?
A. I think so.
Q. And that, the less crazy he is, the more likely he is to tell the truth?
A. I think he is more inclined to tell extravagant stories and tales when he is excited mentally.
Q. Do you know how he was when he swore here before this Court?
A. I do not.
Q. Are you prepared to give a professional opinion that he was so crazy then that he did not know how to tell the truth?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know what condition he was in at the time he refers to in his testimony, when he heard Dr. Mudd made the statement he details?
A. I do not.
Q. You cannot state whether he was sensible enough then to understand the truth or not?
A. I cannot exactly. I have not seen him often of late.
Q. What is moral insanity?
A. I look upon moral insanity where a person is particularly inclined to be immoral. That is the view I take of it. There are various ways.
Q. What do you call mental insanity?
A. When they are not capable of discriminating and appreciating things as the same mind.
Q. Did you ever know Dan. Thomas when he was able to walk about, that he was not capable of understanding plain words when a man spoke to him about plain matters?
A. I do not know that I did; but I could state some reasons why I have considered him insane.
By the COURT:
Q. What is the form of insanity under which Mr. Thomas labors?
A. There is no specific form that I know of, except at times a peculiar excitement, and inability to appreciate matters and things as other people do. It is not dementia; it is not a monomania; it is not what is called aberration of mind. There are certain forms of insanity which exacerbate and remit, and are known by no specific name as any particular form of insanity.
Q. Do you think the form of insanity under which he is laboring would lead him to imagine that he heard a conversation, for instance, that he never did hear?
A. I have seen him in a mood of mind when I would not doubt but that he would be so insane.
Q. Would fancy that he heard something said that was not said?
A. Yes, sir: I have known him to labor under the most decided delusions and hallucinations.
Q. You have known him to narrate things which should have occurred, and which he should have heard, that to your knowledge were purely imaginary,—that he never did hear?
A. No doubt of it: yes, sir.
Q. You have known that yourself?
A. Yes, sir; oftentimes.
Q. How long have you entertained the opinion that Mr. Thomas was not of sound mind?
A. I went to a family school in our neighborhood with Mr. Thomas when he was a small boy. I was his senior, perhaps, four or five years. There was something very eccentric and amusing about him at that time, different from other boys; and he was a source of amusement in the way of eccentricity to his schoolmates. Seven or eight years ago, or perhaps longer than that, his insane condition of mind seemed to manifest itself in the estimation of everybody in our neighborhood. I say everybody,—yes, I believe almost every one. The common expression was that Daniel Thomas was crazy.
Q. I ask the question of time. How long have you entertained that opinion?
A. I say, seven or eight years.
Q. Have you ever expressed an opinion to any one that he was a man not of sound mind?
A. Over and over again, and a long time ago, before this war.
Q. Do you know that he has ever been objected to as a witness before a court of justice on the ground that he was not of sound mind?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Have you ever known him to be a witness in a court of justice?
A. Yes, sir: on one occasion I did.
Q. Was his evidence objected to on the ground of insanity?
A. I think not.
Q. You say you have known Dr. Samuel Mudd a good while?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is his reputation,—a loyal, or disloyal man?
A. From my association with him, I have had to consider him as sympathizing with the South.
Q. Did you ever know him to harbor persons who were rebels and in sympathy with the South?
A. Never. I know of no treasonable or disloyal act of his.
Q. You do not know that that was the resort of persons of disloyal sentiments?
A. No, sir. I have generally considered Dr. Sam. Mudd as very temperate in his discussions and expressions relative to the war. His ordinary matter was the right or legality of secession, which he maintained. He has generally, however, spoken temperately, never using abusive or opprobrious epithets towards the heads of the Government. In saying that he was very temperate in this regard, I must add, if I may be allowed, very much more so than of the citizens of benighted Charles County, in Southern Maryland.
Q. There were certain local military organizations in the neighborhood in the early part of the war, companies that were organized: what was their object?
A. There was an organization at Port Tobacco, the object of which, I think, was treasonable. I think it probable, but I am not satisfied of that. That was my impression at the time, though it was for the purpose of quelling insurrections, &c., in the neighborhood. It may have been so. I have regarded Dr. Sam. Mudd, for several months prior to the fall of Richmond and the surrender of the rebel army of Lee, as taking a very handsome prospective view of the downfall of the Rebellion. I remember administering an oath to him last year, and was forcibly impressed with the respect and reverence with which he took the oath, making a decided contrast from many others to whom I administered the oath on that occasion; and, so far as I know, he has abided the provisions of that oath.
By MR. EWING:
Q. When did you administer the oath you speak of to Samuel A. Mudd?
A. It was at the time, if I remember rightly, when the sense of the people was taken relative to the calling of a convention to frame a new constitution for the State of Maryland,—in June or July of last year: I do not remember, or it may have been earlier.
Q. Were you acting in an official capacity?
A. I was rather improvised by two of the judges as the chief judge of the election that day, in the absence of the judge. I think I administered the oath to some two hundred that day.
Q. For how long a time past has he spoken of the downfall of the Rebellion as being assured?
A. I think from and after the time, so far as I can gather, if not before.